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Experts have recently argued that guidelines to take the full course of antibiotics are due for 
revision, instead recommending that patients stop when they feel better. It is unknown how 




In a pre-registered experiment, we use a national sample of 1,263 participants from UK to test 
the effects of a message that reverses the prior full-course guideline (versus a status quo message 
of take the full course). We also test a secondary intervention that emphasizes that medical 
guidance and evidence may change over time.  
 
Results 
Early stoppage messages shifted personal beliefs and perceived expert consensus about early 
stoppage (a shift of 16%, 95% CI: 13.8% to 17.9%, p < .001) and behavioral intent (a shift of 
19%, 95% CI: 15.3 to 21.8%, p < .001) in the intended direction. However, the new guideline 
also slightly decreased acceptance of uncertainty about future guidelines (a decrease of 2%, 95% 
CI: .2% to 3.1%, p = .022) and general intention to comply with other guidelines in the future (a 
decrease of 6%, 95% CI: 2.6% to 8.4%, p < .001), but did not affect perceptions of medical 
researchers’ or doctors’ credibility or respondents’ epistemic efficacy. Prior belief about early 
stoppage did not moderate receptivity to messages. Notably, though, receptivity to early 
stoppage messages was contingent on deference to experts. We find no effect of a secondary 
intervention that emphasizes that medical guidance and evidence may change over time.  
 
Conclusion 
Overall, findings suggest the (U.K.) public is likely to accept new guidelines that change long 
standing advice to take a full course of antibiotics. While respondents show wariness about 
further future revisions, these data do not show that changing guidelines undermines trust in the 
experts that produce them.   
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Medical best practices and patient guidelines evolve. This simple fact raises an important 
question: how does the public respond to changing advice? In the case of antibiotics, 
longstanding consensus on the use of antibiotics has been “always complete the full prescription, 
even if you feel better” (WHO, 2015a). In a recent issue of BMJ, Llewelyn et al. (2017) argue 
that this medical advice is due for revision as there is little evidence demonstrating that this 
behavior achieves its goal of preventing bacteria from developing resistance to antibiotics. Given 
the existential threat to global health posed by antibacterial resistance (WHO, 2015b; The World 
Bank, 2016) and the possible emergence of expert dissensus (Llewelyn et al., 2017; Del Mar & 
Looke, 2017; NHS, 2017) about the use of antibiotics, it is essential to measure public opinion 
about antibiotics (and antibacterial resistance) and to examine how the public may respond to 
changing expert guidance.  
In this manuscript, we examine public beliefs about taking a full course of antibiotics, whether 
the public would accept new expert guidelines, what factors may condition their acceptance, and 
what effects message may have on behavioral intentions. Our goal here is not to advocate for or 
against the Llewelyn et al. (2017) position. Rather, as social scientists, our goal is to understand 
how the public may respond to a possible dramatic shift in official health advice. 
While previous studies have examined the effect of public information campaigns about 
antibiotic use (e.g., Huttner et al. 2010; McNulty et al., 2010), these campaigns have occurred 
amidst the prevailing elite consensus. Consistent with the call for strategic communication 
campaigns to reduce unnecessary antibiotic use (Review on Antimicrobial Resistance, 2016), it 
is important to determine whether revised guidelines from medical experts can result in 
appropriate mitigative behaviors (Nisbet, 2016).  
Compliance and spillover effects for revised recommendations    4 
Examining how the public responds to a possible change in guidance about antibiotics may 
inform our broader understanding of how the public responds to emerging dissensus or shifting 
guidelines more generally. Evolving evidence is a key facet of public health crises (Brossard et 
al., 2018), but its effects on the public are poorly understood. Although researchers recently have 
devoted more attention to understanding the implications of conflicting medical information 
(e.g., Han et al., 2018; Nagler, 2014; Nagler et al., 2019), much more needs to be done 
(Carpenter et al., 2015).       
How would the public respond to new guidelines for the use of antibiotics?      
In this study, we compare how two different messages about taking antibiotics – one that patients 
should complete their course no matter what, and a second message that patients should stop 
treatment when they feel better – affect beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions.  
We expect the public to exhibit fairly low levels of knowledge about antibiotic use 
(Tamasauskiene et al., 2018). Prior work shows that individuals with less knowledge and weaker 
attitudes about a given issue are more receptive to new information regarding that issue (e.g., 
Ahluwalia, 2000). Consequently, we expect a main effect on beliefs and attitudes from messages 
communicating new expert health guidelines. 
H1. Compared to a standard “complete the course” message, the “stop when better” 
message will result in greater belief and behavioral intent matching the “stop when 
better” recommendation.  
However, there may be some important conditional effects based on prior attitudes (Nyhan et al. 
2014, Nyhan and Reifler 2015). If the message contradicts respondents’ prior beliefs about how 
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staying with a course of treatment affects antibiotic resistance, then they may be less likely to 
accept the new guideline.  
H2. Message effects will be moderated by their agreement with prior belief about best practice. 
Finally, respondents who believe they personally know more about best practice in medical 
treatment than experts (Motta et al., 2018; Dunning, 2011) will be less influenced than those who 
believe that experts know more. We refer to the placement of experts’ knowledge above one’s 
own as deference to experts.  
H3. Message effects will increase with deference to experts. 
There may also be spillover effects of exposure to revised guidelines. Because revised guidelines 
by definition contradict prior consensus, exposure to these might trigger a similar set of negative 
psychological responses found in studies of conflicting health information (e.g., Nagler et al., 
2019). Conflicting information can cause pessimism and feelings of helplessness (Lee et al., 
2016; Nagler, 2014; Han et al., 2007), which may manifest in reduced perceived credibility of 
experts, less acceptance of uncertainty in medical guidelines, lower epistemic efficacy, and 
spillover effects reducing intended compliance with future guidelines in other domains.  
RQ1. Does exposure to revised guidelines result in spillover effects on credibility, acceptance of 
uncertainty, epistemic efficacy, or general future compliance? 
Communicating contingency       
Evidence, and expert recommendations drawn from it, are subject to revision as newer data is 
collected. However, the potential effects of communicating this contingency, particularly in 
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conjunction with new guidelines themselves, are unknown. There are diverging views on how 
this uncertainty may affect the public. On the one hand, such messaging may reduce overall trust 
and compliance with experts (Han et al., 2018). Statements made with confidence are more 
persuasive (Thomas & McFadyen, 1995), and expressing uncertainty can make experts seem less 
credible. Introducing uncertainty may provoke a set of negative psychological reactions known 
as ambiguity aversion (Camerer & Weber, 1992). Messages that emphasise the potentially 
temporary nature of current guidelines, therefore, may induce uncertainty or even backlash about 
the topic in question (Lee et al., 2018; Dixon & Clarke, 2012; Jensen & Hurley, 2012; Chang, 
2013; Nagler et al., 2019) or health research and expert guidance more generally (Chang, 2015; 
Nagler et al, 2019). Han et al. (2018) find that uncertainty about risk and efficacy reduced 
vaccination intention for a hypothetical vaccine-preventable disease, and messaging about the 
expected nature of this uncertainty (“normalized uncertainty”), which parallels our contingency 
messaging, did not mitigate this outcome.  
 
Conversely, it is possible that explicitly communicating the unsettled nature of scientific and 
medical knowledge may reduce resistance to new guidelines (Jensen, 2008). As Jensen points 
out, communicating uncertainty can help maintain the trustworthiness of scientists as a strategy 
for communicating their objectivity, following Popper’s claim about the perpetual tentativity of 
scientific knowledge (1961). News coverage of medical research that includes “hedges,” or 
details of a study’s limitations, has been found to increase the credibility of both scientists and 
journalists (Jensen, 2008; Jensen et al., 2011). Recent work on climate research communication 
finds that communicating fully bounded uncertainty (i.e., sea-level rise could be between 1 and 7 
ft.) increases trust and message acceptance, but these gains were eliminated when acknowledging 
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irreducible uncertainty (the unpredictable exacerbation of sea-level rise effects brought on by 
global warming-induced storms).  
 
All in all, it is unclear how the specific form of uncertainty or “hedge” we employ — a message 
about the contingency of all scientific findings, rather than a specific result — will affect public 
attitudes. We assess the possibilities with a randomized addition of text to both primary 
messages, allowing us to explore the effects of the presence of an embedded message about 
scientific evidence’s contingent nature.  
 
RQ2. Does a caveat about evolving evidence affect message receptivity (factual beliefs, 
behavioral intent), or broader issues of credibility, general future compliance, epistemic efficacy, 
and acceptance of uncertainty?  
 
RQ3. Are “evolving evidence” message effects moderated by prior belief, do they interact with 
the main message condition, and is there a three-way interaction among these factors? 
 
Methods 
To measure attitudes about antibiotic use and to evaluate the effects of expert messages, we 
conducted an online-survey experiment in the UK (N = 1,263) using a stratified quota sample of 
adults in the UK age 16+. Data were collected in November 2018 by the Internet market research 
company Kantar. (Kantar also collected the UK data for the Special Eurobarometer 478 on 
Antimicrobial Resistance in September 2018.) Kantar maintains a proprietary opt-in online 
panel. Subjects are recruited into the general panel by “traditional advertising as well as internal 
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and external affiliate networks.” For this specific survey, subjects from the panel were invited by 
email. Sample size was based on the size of Kantar’s GB Online omnibus survey. Quotas were 
set for age, sex, and region (see Table A1 for demographics). Participants were compensated by 
Kantar. This research was approved by the institutional review board of the University of Exeter. 
Respondents who took part in the survey gave their consent. Hypotheses, design, and analyses 
were pre-registered using the Open Science Framework. Materials, analysis plan, and data 
available at: https://osf.io/8nfwc/?view_only=53f0068b0e9b4e868bbe3ec1c3c750fc. The lead 
author affirms that the manuscript is an honest, accurate, and transparent account of the study 
being reported; that no important aspects of the study have been omitted; and that any 
discrepancies from the study as originally registered have been explained. 
Design 
Our design employed two messages about antibiotic treatment. Prior to exposure, respondents 
were informed that “[w]e are interested in what people think of the following message being 
designed to potentially disseminate in the interest of public health. Please read the message 
carefully and answer the questions that follow honestly.” All respondents received either a 
message about current best practice that patients should complete their course no matter what (n 
= 630) (which serves as our baseline or reference group), or a second message that patients 
should stop treatment when they feel better (n = 633). Participants were randomly assigned to 
view one of the two messages. Each message included a brief description of disagreement about 
antibiotics in the news, followed by the randomized suggested course of action. For our indicator 
variable, exposure to the “stop when better” message was scored as 1, and exposure to the 
“complete the course” message was scored as 0.  
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Embedded within this experiment, we also randomized whether each message included a caveat 
about the contingent nature of medical guidelines (caveat n = 633, no caveat n = 630; for the 
indicator variable, exposure to the caveat was scored as 1). Therefore, we employed a fully 
crossed 2 x 2 factorial design (full course + caveat n = 316; full course + no caveat n = 314; stop 
when better + caveat n = 317; stop when better + no caveat n = 316). 
Procedure 
Participants first provided demographic information, as well as pre-treatment knowledge about 
and attitudes toward antibiotics, and a pre-treatment measure of deference to experts, before 
reading the treatment message. After considering the message, participants provided responses 
for outcomes variables. Finally, participants were debriefed using the NHS’s discussion of the 
debate and current guidelines.  
This research was done without patient involvement.  Patients were not invited to comment on 
the study design and were not consulted to develop patient relevant outcomes or interpret the 
results. Patients were not invited to contribute to the writing or editing of this document for 
readability or accuracy. 
Measures 
Outcome variables  
Early stoppage beliefs were assessed using agreement with the following 7-pt Likert items: “I 
think that taking antibiotics for longer than necessary increases the risk of antibiotic resistance,” 
and “I think that stopping antibiotic treatment early may encourage antibiotic resistance.” 
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Because we structure our analysis to measure the effects of the "stop when better" message 
relative to the standard “complete the course” message, we subtract the second measure from the 
first, with the resulting score ranging from -6 to 6 (M = .49, SD = 2.41). We then ask whether 
participants agree that “most experts” endorse the same statements. Again, the second item was 
subtracted from the first (M = .41, SD = 2.38). These two difference scores were averaged (alpha 
= .82). Robustness checks show that the early stoppage message significantly affected each belief 
item, across personal and expert consensus beliefs, in the early-stoppage relevant direction. 
Early stoppage behavioral intent (M = 2.74, SD = 1.68, alpha = .90) was measured using the 
average of two 7-pt Likert items: “How likely or unlikely is it that you would take [would 
instruct family members to take] the full course of antibiotics for yourself in the future, 
regardless of how you are feeling at any point in the treatment?” (each reversed such that early-
stoppage aligned behaviors scored higher).  
A third behavioral item, general future compliance, was assessed independently, as robustness 
checks showed that the message treatment affected it in the opposite direction as the two early-
stoppage-specific behavioral intent items. General future compliance (M = 5.44, SD = 1.45) was 
measured with the following 7-pt. Likert item: “In general, how likely or unlikely is it that you 
would follow the guidelines of medical researchers on other issues in the future?” 
Credibility was assessed using agreement with the average of four 7 pt. Likert items: “Medical 
researchers [doctors] are trustworthy,” and “medical researchers [doctors] have a high level of 
expertise,” (M = 5.44, SD = 1.10, alpha = .90).   
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Epistemic efficacy (M = 4.27, SD = 1.26, alpha = .67) was measured using average agreement 
with two 7 pt. Likert items: “I feel confident that I can find the truth about issues in science and 
medicine,” and “If I wanted to, I could figure out the facts behind most scientific and medical 
disputes,” (adapted from Pingree, 2011).   
Acceptance of uncertainty (M = 4.39, SD = .83, alpha = .39) was measured using average 
agreement with four 7 pt. Likert items: “I am comfortable accepting uncertainty in the guidelines 
issued by medical institutions”; “There is no reason to follow new guidelines because they are 
always changing anyway” (reverse coded); “New guidelines that contradict old guidelines make 
me uncomfortable” (reverse coded); and “I prefer to carry out a current medical recommendation 
even though it may change in the future.” These items draw on related research on uncertainty 
preferences (Carcioppolo et al., 2016; see also Han et al., 2018) but are modified to better match 
our research questions. The scale exhibits low reliability due to reverse-coding of two items 
(reversed in order to reduce acquiesence bias). Factor analysis shows the reverse-coded items 
form a separate subscale (alpha = .61) from the other two items (alpha = .56). According to our 
pre-registered analysis plan, we model agreement with each item separately in our robustness 
check. This analysis reveals that the primary driver of the results we discuss in the main text (the 
item most affected by the stop message) is agreement with the “I prefer to carry out a current 
medical recommendation even though it may change in the future” item. Full supplementary 
analysis is shown in Appendix.  
Pre-treatment variables 
Prior belief was measured using a forced choice item asking which of the following more closely 
matches the participant’s belief: “I think that stopping antibiotic treatment early may encourage 
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antibiotic resistance,” (mapping to the pre-existing consensus) or “I think that taking antibiotics 
for longer than necessary increases the risk of antibiotic resistance,” (mapping to the recent 
counter-argument) or “I don’t know.” Participants then provided confidence in their belief (“Not 
at all,” “Somewhat,” “Very”). The prior belief measure used in statistical models is the resulting 
6 pt. measure with “don’t knows” (n = 221) excluded, where 6 = very confident that taking 
longer than necessary increases risk (M = 4.02, SD = 1.89).  Excluding “don’t knows” as per the 
analysis plan resulted in n = 517 for the full course message treatment and n = 525 for the stop 
when better message treatment. Overall, 29.93% responded that “stopping antibiotic treatment 
early may encourage antibiotic resistance” matched their beliefs more closely, while 52.57% 
responded that “taking antibiotics for longer than necessary increases the risk of antibiotic 
resistance” matched their beliefs more closely, and 17.50% were unsure.  
Deference to experts was measured with the average of two items asking “Would you say you 
know more or less than medical doctors [scientists] about what’s best for you when it comes to 
taking a prescribed course of medicine?” Responses ranged from 1 (“I know a lot less”) to 6 (“I 
know a lot more”) and were averaged together (M = 2.32, SD = 1.18, alpha = .83), and then 
reversed such that more deferent scores were higher to aid interpretation (adapted from Motta et 
al., 2018).  
Antibiotics knowledge was assessed by gauging agreement with the following statements about 
antibiotics on 7-pt. Likert scales: whether they work on most coughs and colds; can kill bacteria; 
or can kill viruses. In our descriptive analysis, we use the average of these 7-pt. Likert responses, 
with the two incorrect items (regarding viruses and coughs and colds) reversed.  
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Antibiotic resistance concern was measured using agreement with a single item using a 7-pt. 
Likert scale (M = 5.05, SD = 1.57). 
Results 
We first report descriptive results of pre-treatment knowledge and attitudes about antibiotics. 
Knowledge was middling, mirroring prior studies in other countries and the U.K. (e.g., Andre et 
al., 2010; Hwang et al., 2015; Special Eurobarometer 478, 2018; You et al., 2008). 64% correctly 
agreed that antibiotics can kill bacteria, but 38% incorrectly agreed that they can kill viruses, and 
20% incorrectly agreed that they work on most coughs and colds.  
[Table 1] 
Concern about antibacterial resistance was high; just over two-thirds (67.54%) agreed that they 
are worried about this issue (20.51% “strongly agree,” 22.09% “agree,” and 24.94% “somewhat 
agree”). A small but consequential proportion of the sample said they knew slightly more, quite a 
bit more, or a lot more than medical doctors (18%) and scientists (17%) about best practice with 
a prescribed course of medicine. Interestingly, deference to experts and knowledge were 
correlated (Spearman’s rho = .14, p < .001) (or conversely, overconfidence and knowledge were 
inversely correlated) (see Motta et al., 2018).  
 
We tested our hypotheses using ordinary least-squares regression models for each of our 
outcome variables, using Stata 15. The initial models included indicator variables for both 
manipulations (the early-stoppage message and the caveat/“evolving evidence” message), and 
prior belief as a covariate (thus, models included all respondents across the four cells of the 
experiment, while excluding those who responded “don’t know” to the prior belief measure). 
Subsequently we assessed the hypothesized prior belief moderation. For comparison, we re-
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scaled all outcome measures to range from 0-1. Main effects across outcomes are shown in 
Figure 1. For full models, see supplementary materials. Because many of our outcome variables 
are correlated, we also estimated multivariate regression models as robustness tests. The results 
are substantively identical to the independently estimated models.  
[Figure 1] 
 
We find that messaging indicating that patients should now stop a course of antibiotics when 
they feel better to reduce the risk of resistance significantly increased associated factual beliefs 
(b = .16, SE = .01, p < .001) and behavioral intent (b = .19, SE = .02, p < .001). However, the 
early-stoppage message decreased general intention to follow new guidelines of medical 
researchers on other issues in the future (b = -.06, SE = .01, p < .001), and decreased general 
acceptance of uncertainty in medical guidelines (b = -.02, SE = .01, p = .022). The message did 
not affect epistemic efficacy or trust in medical experts. Contrary to our expectations (H2a), for 
no outcomes were these effects contingent on prior belief. In other words, we find that holding 
contrary beliefs about antibiotics prior to the experiment did not induce resistance to the new 
guideline. However, there is a significant main effect of prior belief.  
 
We also find that deference to experts moderates the message’s effects on factual beliefs (b = 
.05, SE = .01, p < .001), behavioral intent (b = .06, SE = .01, p < .001), and acceptance of 
uncertainty (b = -.02, SE = .01, p = .005). The moderating effects of deference for factual beliefs 
and behavioral intent are depicted in Figure 2. As Figure 2 shows, for those who are low in 
deference to experts, there is very little difference in the “stop when better” and “take the full 
course” conditions. However, for those who are higher in deference, there is a large observed 
difference in the outcome variables based on message treatment condition.  
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In addition to the primary messaging experiment, we also examined the effects of including a 
caveat about the contingent nature of current medical advice (RQ2 and RQ3). However, we 
found no effects of the caveat on our outcomes of interest. This null effect of the caveat message 
holds across multiple outcome variables -- factual beliefs, behavioral intent, acceptance of 
uncertainty, expert credibility, general future compliance, and epistemic efficacy (RQ2). 
Moreover, caveat effects were not moderated by prior belief, nor by early stoppage message 
condition exposure, and there was no three-way interaction among these factors (RQ3).   This 
type of contingency messaging appears to be too subtle to affect attitudes, as the manipulation 
check failed (t(1,261) = -0.94, p = .175). This result echoes the null effect of similar “normalized 





As concerns about antibiotic resistance grow, some researchers have suggested patient guidelines 
be revised. A large portion of the UK public surveyed in our study hews closer to the stance in 
favor of early stoppage. In this context, our experiment finds that new guidelines have strong 
positive effects on beliefs about antibiotic treatment and behavioral intentions (see Figure 1). 
Contrary to our expectation, prior beliefs do not condition message acceptance (see Table A4). 
However, individuals who are less deferential to experts were less likely to take up new 
recommendations (see Figure 2).  In addition, the new guidelines also appeared to increase 
general resistance to following future guidelines for other medical issues (see Figure 1). 
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Llewelyn et al. (2017) write in their analysis that “[t]here are reasons to be optimistic that the 
public will accept that completing the course to prevent resistance is wrong if the medical 
profession openly acknowledges that this is so, rather than simply substituting subtle alternatives 
such as ‘exactly as prescribed.’” While further research is needed to hone any messaging 
strategy, our results support this contention. Should health organizations decide to shift antibiotic 
guidelines, the public appears willing to follow specific guidance.  
There are a few points of concern, however. While there is no negative spillover from shifting 
guidelines on perceptions of experts’ credibility, patients’ intended future compliance with other 
guidelines is in question. It appears that the public is willing to follow important, specific health 
recommendations even if they represent a shift from current practice, but at the same time 
expresses dissatisfaction by reporting lower intention to comply going forward, and accepts less 
uncertainty going forward. To avoid eroding confidence, guideline changes should be made 
sparingly. Further, resistance to new guidelines is strongest among members of the public who 
believe they know more than experts. As a result, some messages may need to be tailored to 
better reach this subpopulation (see e.g., MacFarlane et al., 2020).       
It is also worth reflecting on the null effect of the additional text about evolving evidence. 
Arguably, even though this messaging failed to positively affect outcomes such as acceptance of 
uncertainty or perceived credibility of experts, these results can be seen as encouraging. Should 
these results hold, generalizing beyond the specific context we examine, they would allow public 
health communicators to more accurately convey the nature of their guidelines and the evidence 
that underpins them, without prompting negative responses to specific recommendations or 
expert advice more broadly. The notion of contingency inherent in medical guidelines — and 
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how the public may react — also speaks to broader questions of science literacy. Our caveat 
manipulation is intended to emphasise a basic fact of the process of science: the evidence base is 
always evolving. We find that this messaging about process does not affect reactions to a specific 
guideline shift that is a direct result of this process. However, further research on how best to 
communicate the scientific process in light of conflicts or retractions is needed (Hilgard & 
Jamieson, 2017; Jamieson, 2018). 
Given our theory of message effects and findings, we can speculate about generalizability in 
terms of geographic contexts and which issues are at the heart of shifting guidelines. Based on 
similar levels of awareness and concern about antibiotics in other countries (Andre et al., 2010; 
Hwang et al., 2015; Special Eurobarometer 478, 2018; You et al. 2008), as well as relatively 
similar levels of deference to medical experts (Motta et al., 2018), it would be reasonable to 
expect similar uptake of revised guidelines in the U.S., the rest of Europe, and elsewhere. We 
may also expect the medical community to be effective in communicating revised guidelines for 
other low-salience issues that are unlikely to inspire backlash (e.g., the newly revised guideline 
to avoid daily aspirin unless prescribed [American Heart Association, 2019]). However, 
revisions concerning more contentious issues, such as vaccine schedules, may be less accepted 
and subject to more pushback. We may also see less acceptance on issues for which there is 
already guideline-shift fatigue, such as red meat consumption (Kolata, 2019).  
Limitations 
There are important limitations to our study, however. Our design employed experimental 
vignettes, which limit external validity despite their established relevance in the study of 
strategic health communication and allowance for causal inference. Field experiments are needed 
Compliance and spillover effects for revised recommendations    18 
to examine how such messages may persuade as they vie for attention outside a controlled 
setting. Likewise, our design only allowed for us to measure behavioral intention, although 
studies show intention is linked with observed behavior (Sheeran & Webb, 2006).      
On the other hand, it is worth reflecting on the implications of receptivity to new medical 
guidelines in the absence of source cues or evidence. Although respondents were informed that 
they were evaluating messages that may be “disseminate[d] in the interest of public health,” we 
did not attribute the messages to any specific medical or health organization, reasoning that to do 
so would be unethical. Further, the revised guidelines did not present specific evidence backing 
the shift, instead referencing expert consensus. However, credible sources are critical in the 
dissemination of new health information, particularly if it contradicts prior beliefs (Bode & 
Vraga, 2018), and evaluating evidence is crucial in reaching informed health decisions (Verhoef 
et al., 2007). Arguably, that our respondents were receptive to the message without these 
components may suggest too much credulity on behalf of the public. Future work may seek 
simultaneously to examine compliance with medical experts as well as appropriate skepticism of 
unsupported claims by randomizing source and evidence within revised guideline messages.  
Conclusion 
Medical associations and health organizations should be aware of the influence their messaging 
on revised antibiotic guidelines can have going forward, as the debate about best practice 
continues in the face of growing concern about antibacterial resistance.  
But our results also speak to the broader impact of shifting medical guidelines on the public. 
Communicating in the interest of the public health means considering not only the effects of 
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revised guidelines on behaviours of immediate interest, where our results suggest we are more 
likely to see compliance, but also on downstream attitudes about expert recommendations in 
general. Frequent revisions may result in the slow erosion of public confidence.  
 
 
Data sharing statement 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 





disagree) 2 3 4 5 6 
7 (Strongly 
agree) 
Antibiotic resistance concern 3.96% 4.28% 5.62% 18.61% 24.94% 22.09% 20.51% 
Antibiotics kill bacteria 5.23% 5.54% 7.13% 17.66% 25.02% 22.17% 17.26% 
Antibiotics work on colds 33.81% 20.35% 11.56% 14.65% 10.45% 5.94% 3.25% 





1 (I know a lot 
less) 2 3 4 5 
6 (I know a lot 
more) 
Know more or less than 
  medical doctors about taking a 
prescribed course of medicine 33.10% 25.89% 23.20% 11.56% 4.35% 1.90% 
Know more or less than scientists 
about taking a prescribed course of 
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Figure 1. Effect of early stoppage message 
 
 Note: This figure reports OLS parameter estimates for multiple models. Specifically, each horizontal line reports the effect of the 
early stoppage message (compared to receiving the “complete the full course” message) for each outcome variable. The effect of 
the early stoppage message treatment is expressed as percent change in each outcome variable (with 95% confidence intervals). 
Each model controls for prior belief and a randomly assigned contingency message. Full model output can be found in the 
Supplemental Materials. To aid comparison, all variables are scored to range from zero to one. Factual belief and antibiotic 
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Figure 2. Message effects on factual beliefs and behavioral intent, across deference to experts 
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Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics and Primary Analyses 
 
Table A1. Sample demographic characteristics 
 Full sample Full Course Treatment Early Stoppage Treatment 
Age M = 45.99, SD = 17.66 M = 46.23, SD = 18.00 M = 45.73, SD = 17.32 
Sex 50.91% female 51.11% female 50.71% female 
Ethnicity 85.48% British 86.81% British 84.15% British 
Region 84.96% England 
8.39% Scotland 
4.28% Wales 








2.37% Northern Ireland 
Education (median) Higher or secondary or 
further education (A-levels, 
BTEC, etc.) 
Higher or secondary or 
further education (A-levels, 
BTEC, etc.) 
Higher or secondary or 
further education (A-levels, 
BTEC, etc.) 
Children in household  30.17% 30.95% 29.38% 
 
Note: Regional population estimates from the Office for National Statistics, 2018: England: 84.3%; Scotland: 8.1%; Wales: 
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Figure A1. Antibiotics knowledge response frequencies 
 
Figure A2. Deference to experts response frequencies  
 




Table A2. Zero-order correlations of outcome measures 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Factual belief 1      
2. Behavioral intent  0.3028 1     
3. Future compliance 0.0069 -0.4907 1    
4. Expert credibility 0.0417 -0.3151 0.5089 1   
5. Acceptance of 
uncertainty -0.053 -0.2018 0.3759 0.3723 1  
6. Epistemic efficacy 0.0045 -0.0661 0.1898 0.2437 0.1079 1 
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Table A3. Effects of Early Stoppage Message versus Full Course Message 
 
 Factual belief   General future compliance 
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI  
Stop message 0.158 0.010 0.000 0.138 0.178  Stop message -0.06 0.01 0.000 -0.08 -0.03 
Contingency caveat -0.004 0.010 0.700 -0.016 0.024  Contingency caveat 0.01 0.01 0.553 -0.02 0.04 
Prior belief 0.032 0.003 0.000 -0.038 -0.027  Prior belief 0.00 0.00 0.754 -0.01 0.01 
Constant 0.336 0.014 0.685 0.308 0.364  Constant 0.78 0.02 0.000 0.74 0.82 
R2 0.267      R2 0.01     
 Expert credibility   Acceptance of uncertainty 
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message -0.013 0.011 0.261 -0.010 0.035  Stop message -0.020 0.009 0.022 -0.00 -0.04 
Contingency caveat -0.004 0.011 0.698 -0.027 0.018  Contingency caveat -0.002 0.009 0.832 -0.02 0.02 
Prior belief -0.004 0.003 0.232 -0.010 0.002  Prior belief -0.001 0.002 0.631 -0.00 0.00 
Constant 0.770 0.016 0.000 0.739 0.801  Constant 0.585 0.012 0.000 0.56 0.61 
R2 0.003      R2 0.005     
 Epistemic efficacy   Early stoppage behavioral intent  
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI  
Stop message -0.015 0.013 0.255 -0.011 0.041  Stop message 0.19 0.02 0.000 0.15 0.22 
Contingency caveat -0.003 0.013 0.792 -0.029 0.022  Contingency caveat -0.01 0.02 0.415 -0.05 0.02 
Prior belief -0.012 0.003 0.001 -0.019 -0.005  Prior belief 0.01 0.00 0.135 0.00 0.02 
Constant 0.612 0.018 0.000 0.577 0.648  Constant 0.16 0.02 0.000 0.12 0.21 
R2 0.013      R2 0.11     
 
Note: N = 1,042. Outcome measures re-scaled to range from 0-1.  
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Table A4. Effects of Early Stoppage Message versus Full Course Message, by Prior Belief  
 Factual belief   General future compliance 
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message 0.162 0.024 0.000 0.115 0.209  Stop message -0.08 0.03 0.023 -0.15 -0.01 
Contingency caveat -0.004 0.010 0.701 -0.016 0.024  Contingency caveat 0.01 0.01 0.557 -0.02 0.04 
Prior belief 0.032 0.004 0.000 -0.039 -0.024  Prior belief 0.00 0.01 0.454 -0.02 0.01 
Stop message X prior belief -0.001 0.005 0.857 -0.012 0.010  Stop message X prior belief 0.01 0.01 0.458 -0.01 0.02 
Constant 0.334 0.018 0.830 0.299 0.369  Constant 0.79 0.03 0.000 0.74 0.85 
R2 0.267      R2 0.01     
 Expert credibility   Acceptance of uncertainty 
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message -0.039 0.027 0.152 -0.014 0.091  Stop message -0.036 0.021 0.079 -0.004 0.077 
Contingency caveat -0.005 0.011 0.693 -0.027 0.018  Contingency caveat -0.002 0.009 0.827 -0.019 0.015 
Prior belief -0.000 0.004 0.910 -0.009 0.008  Prior belief -0.001 0.003 0.792 -0.006 0.007 
Stop message X prior belief 0.006 0.006 0.290 -0.018 0.005  Stop message X prior belief 0.004 0.005 0.386 -0.013 0.005 
Constant 0.783 0.020 0.000 0.744 0.823  Constant 0.593 0.015 0.000 0.563 0.623 
R2 0.004      R2 0.006     
 Epistemic efficacy   Early stoppage behavioral intent 
 b SE p 95% CI    b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message -0.018 0.031 0.571 -0.043 0.078  Stop message 0.17 0.04 0.000 0.10 0.25 
Contingency caveat -0.003 0.013 0.791 -0.029 0.022  Contingency caveat -0.01 0.02 0.414 -0.05 0.02 
Prior belief -0.012 0.005 0.016 -0.021 -0.002  Prior belief 0.01 0.01 0.414 -0.01 0.02 
Stop message X prior belief 0.001 0.007 0.925 -0.014 0.013  Stop  message X prior belief 0.00 0.01 0.747 -0.01 0.02 
Constant 0.614 0.023 0.000 0.568 0.659  Constant 0.17 0.03 0.000 0.11 0.23 
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R2 0.013      R2 0.11     
 
Note: N = 1,042. Outcome measures re-scaled to range from 0-1.  
 
Table A5. Effects of Early Stoppage Message versus Full Course Message, by Deference to 
Experts 
 Factual belief   General future compliance 
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message -0.10 0.04 0.010 -0.17 -0.02  Stop message 0.04 0.05 0.466 -0.07 0.15 
Contingency caveat -0.01 0.01 0.463 -0.03 0.01  Contingency caveat 0.01 0.01 0.676 -0.02 0.03 
Deference -0.02 0.01 0.000 -0.03 -0.01  Deference 0.06 0.01 0.000 0.04 0.07 
Stop message X deference 0.05 0.01 0.000 0.04 0.07  Stop message X deference -0.02 0.01 0.104 -0.04 0.00 
Constant 0.57 0.03 0.000 0.51 0.62  Constant 0.50 0.04 0.000 0.43 0.57 
R2 0.19      R2 0.06     
 Expert credibility   Acceptance of uncertainty 
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message 0.03 0.04 0.527 -0.05 0.11  Stop message 0.06 0.03 0.056 0.00 0.12 
Contingency caveat 0.00 0.01 0.819 -0.02 0.02  Contingency caveat 0.00 0.01 0.863 -0.01 0.02 
Deference 0.04 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.05  Deference 0.04 0.00 0.000 0.03 0.05 
Stop message X deference -0.01 0.01 0.397 -0.02 0.01  Stop message X deference -0.02 0.01 0.005 -0.03 -0.01 
Constant 0.55 0.03 0.000 0.50 0.61  Constant 0.39 0.02 0.000 0.35 0.44 
R2 0.06      R2 0.08     
 Epistemic efficacy   Early stoppage behavioral intent 
 b SE p 95% CI    b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message -0.02 0.05 0.706 -0.11 0.07  Stop message -0.11 0.06 0.081 -0.23 0.01 
Contingency caveat -0.01 0.01 0.377 -0.03 0.01  Contingency caveat -0.02 0.01 0.195 -0.05 0.01 
Deference -0.04 0.01 0.000 -0.05 -0.03  Deference -0.05 0.01 0.000 -0.07 -0.04 
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Stop message X deference 0.00 0.01 0.865 -0.02 0.02  Stop message X deference 0.06 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.08 
Constant 0.75 0.03 0.000 0.68 0.81  Constant 0.46 0.04 0.000 0.38 0.55 
R2 0.05      R2 0.12     
 
Note: N = 1,042. Outcome measures re-scaled to range from 0-1.  
 
 
Table A6. Effects of Contingency Caveat by Prior Belief  
 
 Factual belief   General future compliance 
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI  
Stop message 0.158 0.010 0.000 0.1381943 0.1783437  Stop message -0.06 0.01 0.000 -0.08 -0.03 
Contingency caveat 0.025 0.024 0.303 -0.0721444 0.0224934  Contingency caveat .00 .03 0.967 -.07 .07 
Prior belief 0.036 0.004 0.000 -0.0433322 -0.0284208  Prior belief 0.00 0.01 0.653 -0.01 0.01 
Caveat X prior belief -0.007 0.005 0.188 -0.0035013 0.0178075  Caveat X prior belief 0.00 0.01 0.747 -0.01 0.02 
Constant 0.322 0.018 0.000 0.287 0.357  Constant 0.79 0.03 0.000 0.74 0.84 
R2 0.267      R2 0.01     
 Expert credibility   Acceptance of uncertainty 
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message -0.013 0.011 0.264 -0.0096508 0.0351738  Stop message -0.020 0.009 0.021 0.0030525 0.0374973 
Contingency caveat 0.021 0.027 0.446 -0.0323139 0.073344  Contingency caveat -0.026 0.021 0.210 -0.0665503 0.0146411 
Prior belief -0.001 0.004 0.890 -0.0089098 0.0077379  Prior belief -0.004 0.003 0.214 -0.010449 0.0023437 
Caveat X prior belief -0.006 0.006 0.306 -0.0180979 0.0056922  Caveat X prior belief 0.006 0.005 0.199 -0.0031517 0.0151296 
Constant 0.758 0.020 0.000 0.719 0.797  Constant 0.596 0.015 0.000 0.567 0.626 
R2 0.004      R2 0.007     
 Epistemic efficacy   Early stoppage behavioral intent 
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message -0.015 0.013 0.258 -0.0108728 0.0405299  Stop message 0.01 0.04 0.803 -0.07 0.09 
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Contingency caveat 0.020 0.031 0.510 -0.0402569 0.0809066  Contingency caveat 0.19 0.02 0.000 0.15 0.22 
Prior belief -0.009 0.005 0.060 -0.0187087 0.0003821  Prior belief 0.01 0.01 0.126 0.00 0.02 
Caveat X prior belief -0.006 0.007 0.395 -0.0195546 0.0077268  Caveat X prior belief -0.01 0.01 0.510 -0.02 0.01 
Constant 0.601 0.023 0.000 0.556 0.645  Constant 0.15 0.03 0.000 0.10 0.21 
R2 0.013      R2 0.11     
 




Table A7. Effects of Early Stoppage Message versus Full Course Message, by Contingency 
Caveat and Prior Belief 
 
 Factual belief  General future compliance 
  b p 95% CI   b p 95% CI 
Stop message 0.15 0.000 0.12 0.18 Stop message -0.05 0.009 -0.09 -0.01 
Contingency caveat 0.01 0.757 -0.05 0.07 Contingency caveat 0.02 0.616 -0.06 0.11 
Prior belief 0.04 0.000 0.03 0.04 Prior belief 0.00 0.653 -0.01 0.01 
Caveat X prior belief -0.01 0.371 -0.02 0.01 Caveat X prior belief 0.00 0.746 -0.02 0.02 
Stop message X caveat 0.03 0.425 -0.04 0.10 Stop message X caveat -0.05 0.393 -0.15 0.06 
Stop message X caveat X prior 0.00 0.791 -0.02 0.01 Stop message X caveat X prior 0.01 0.328 -0.01 0.03 
Constant 0.33 0.000 0.29 0.36 Constant 0.79 0.000 0.74 0.84 




Expert credibility  Acceptance of uncertainty 
  b p 95% CI   b p 95% CI 
Stop message -0.01 0.707 -0.04 0.03 Stop message -0.02 0.085 -0.05 0.00 
Contingency caveat 0.06 0.090 -0.01 0.13 Contingency caveat -0.05 0.071 -0.10 0.00 
Prior belief 0.00 0.894 -0.01 0.01 Prior belief 0.00 0.214 -0.01 0.00 
Caveat X prior belief -0.01 0.064 -0.03 0.00 Caveat X prior belief 0.01 0.054 0.00 0.02 
Stop message X caveat -0.07 0.078 -0.15 0.01 Stop message X caveat 0.04 0.186 -0.02 0.11 
Stop message X caveat X prior 0.01 0.085 0.00 0.03 Stop message X caveat X prior -0.01 0.133 -0.02 0.00 
Constant 0.75 0.000 0.71 0.79 Constant 0.60 0.000 0.57 0.63 
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Epistemic efficacy  Early stoppage behavioral intent 
  b p 95% CI   b p 95% CI 
Stop message -0.01 0.653 -0.04 0.03 Stop message 0.20 0.000 0.16 0.25 
Contingency caveat 0.01 0.877 -0.07 0.08 Contingency caveat 0.04 0.453 -0.06 0.14 
Prior belief -0.01 0.061 -0.02 0.00 Prior belief 0.01 0.124 0.00 0.02 
Caveat X prior belief 0.00 0.934 -0.02 0.02 Caveat X prior belief -0.01 0.444 -0.03 0.01 
Stop message X caveat 0.03 0.568 -0.07 0.12 Stop message X caveat -0.05 0.371 -0.17 0.06 
Stop message X caveat X prior -0.01 0.312 -0.03 0.01 Stop message X caveat X prior 0.00 0.697 -0.02 0.03 
Constant 0.60 0.000 0.55 0.64 Constant 0.14 0.000 0.08 0.20 
R2 0.01    R2 0.11    
 
Note: N = 1,042. Outcome measures re-scaled to range from 0-1. 
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Appendix 2. Additional pre-registered moderation analyses 
 
We expect deference’s effect will be strongest when the message matches the respondent’s prior 
belief about antibiotic use (or conversely, less deferent individuals will resist messaging most 
when it contradicts prior belief). 
H3. Message effects will increase with deference to experts, especially when the message 
is consistent with prior belief about best practice. 
We plot defefrence’s effect on factual belief, behavioral intent, and acceptance of uncertainty 
across prior belief below. As the figures show, deference’s moderation effect does not 
consistently increase with the message’s concordance with prior belief. Full results are included 
in Table A7.  
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Figure A4. Early stoppage intent across message, prior belief, and deference to experts 
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Table A8. Effects of Early Stoppage Message versus Full Course Message, by Deference and 
Prior Belief 
 Factual belief   General future compliance  
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI  
Stop message -0.04 0.05 0.474 -0.14 0.06  Stop message 0.20 0.07 0.008 0.05 0.34  
Contingency caveat 0.00 0.01 0.895 -0.02 0.02  Contingency caveat 0.01 0.01 0.478 -0.02 0.04  
Prior belief 0.01 0.01 0.228 -0.01 0.03  Prior belief -0.01 0.01 0.561 -0.04 0.02  
Deference -0.05 0.01 0.000 -0.07 -0.03  Deference 0.05 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.08  
Stop message X deference 0.06 0.01 0.000 0.05 0.08  Stop message X deference -0.01 0.01 0.236 -0.04 0.01  
Stop message X prior belief -0.07 0.02 0.003 -0.12 -0.02  Stop message X prior belief -0.17 0.04 0.000 -0.24 -0.10  
Prior belief X deference 0.01 0.00 0.012 0.00 0.01  Prior belief X deference 0.00 0.00 0.975 -0.01 0.01  
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Stop message X deference X 
prior belief 0.01 0.00 0.005 0.00 0.02  
Stop message X deference 
X prior belief 0.03 0.00 0.000 0.02 0.03  
Constant 0.55 0.04 0.000 0.46 0.63  Constant 0.56 0.06 0.000 0.44 0.68  
R2 0.32      R2 0.09      
 
 
 Expert credibility   Acceptance of uncertainty  
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI  
Stop message 0.19 0.06 0.001 0.08 0.30  Stop message 0.13 0.04 0.004 0.04 0.21  
Contingency caveat 0.00 0.01 0.806 -0.02 0.02  Contingency caveat 0.00 0.01 0.857 -0.02 0.01  
Prior belief -0.02 0.01 0.069 -0.04 0.00  Prior belief -0.01 0.01 0.359 -0.02 0.01  
Deference 0.03 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.05  Deference 0.04 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.06  
Stop message X deference 0.00 0.01 0.649 -0.02 0.01  Stop message X deference -0.02 0.01 0.007 -0.03 -0.01  
Stop message X prior belief -0.17 0.03 0.000 -0.22 -0.11  Stop message X prior belief -0.06 0.02 0.003 -0.10 -0.02  
Prior belief X deference 0.00 0.00 0.340 0.00 0.01  Prior belief X deference 0.00 0.00 0.902 0.00 0.00  
Stop message X deference X 
prior belief 0.02 0.00 0.000 0.02 0.03  
Stop message X deference 
X prior belief 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.00 0.02  
Constant 0.64 0.05 0.000 0.55 0.74  Constant 0.41 0.04 0.000 0.34 0.48  
R2 0.10      R2 0.10      
 
 
 Epistemic efficacy   
 
Early stoppage behavioral intent  
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 
95% 
CI   
Stop message 0.11 0.07 0.103 -0.02 0.24  Stop message -0.34 0.08 0.000 -0.50 -0.17  
Contingency caveat -0.01 0.01 0.669 -0.03 0.02  Contingency caveat -0.01 0.02 0.535 -0.04 0.02  
Prior belief -0.01 0.01 0.352 -0.04 0.01  Prior belief 0.04 0.02 0.026 0.00 0.07  
Deference -0.04 0.01 0.000 -0.07 -0.02  Deference -0.04 0.01 0.017 -0.06 -0.01  
Stop message X deference 0.00 0.01 0.723 -0.02 0.03  Stop message X deference 0.07 0.01 0.000 0.04 0.09  
Stop message X prior belief -0.11 0.03 0.001 -0.17 -0.05  Stop message X prior belief 0.17 0.04 0.000 0.09 0.25  
Prior belief X deference 0.00 0.00 0.794 0.00 0.01  Prior belief X deference -0.01 0.00 0.078 -0.01 0.00  
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Stop message X deference X 
prior belief 0.02 0.00 0.000 0.01 0.02  
Stop message X deference 
X prior belief -0.02 0.01 0.000 -0.04 -0.01  
Constant 0.81 0.06 0.000 0.70 0.92  Constant 0.32 0.07 0.000 0.18 0.46  
R2 0.08      R2 0.16      
 
Note: N = 1,042. Outcome measures re-scaled to range from 0-1.  
 
We also assessed one other potential source of heterogeneous effects. Acceptance of new 
guideline messages should also be greater for those higher in antibiotic resistance concern, as the 
reasoning for treatment recommendation is based on reducing antibiotic resistance.  
H4. Message effects will increase with antibacterial resistance concern.  
We tested this hypothesis using ordinary least-squares regression models for each of our 
outcome variables. We assessed each hypothesized moderation by adding concern and the 
interaction terms to the main effects model. Again, all outcome measures were re-scaled 0-1.  
 
Prior concern about antibacterial resistance appears to strengthen the effects of the “stop” 
message on relevant factual beliefs (b = .03, SE = .01, p < .001) and behavioral intention (b = 
.02, SE = .01, p = .002 ), supporting H4 on key outcomes. Those who were more concerned were 
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Table A9. Effects of Early Stoppage Message versus Full Course Message, by Antibacterial 
Resistance Concern 
 Factual belief   General future compliance 
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI  
Stop message -0.02 0.03 0.544 -0.08 0.04  Stop message -0.02 0.04 0.717 -0.10 0.07 
Contingency caveat 0.01 0.01 0.248 -0.01 0.03  Contingency caveat 0.00 0.01 0.734 -0.02 0.03 
Concern -0.02 0.00 0.000 -0.03 -0.02  Concern 0.05 0.01 0.000 0.03 0.06 
Stop message X concern 0.03 0.01 0.000 0.02 0.04  Stop message X concern -0.01 0.01 0.541 -0.02 0.01 
Constant 0.51 0.02 0.000 0.47 0.56  Constant 0.53 0.03 0.000 0.46 0.59 
R2 0.19      R2 0.09     
             
 Expert credibility   Acceptance of uncertainty 
 b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message 0.03 0.03 0.312 -0.03 0.10  Stop message 0.01 0.03 0.616 -0.04 0.06 
Contingency caveat 0.00 0.01 0.697 -0.02 0.02  Contingency caveat 0.00 0.01 0.890 -0.01 0.02 
Concern 0.04 0.00 0.000 0.03 0.05  Concern 0.02 0.00 0.000 0.011 0.02 
Stop message X concern -0.01 0.01 0.354 -0.02 0.01  Stop message X concern 0.00 0.00 0.713 -0.01 0.01 
Constant 0.57 0.02 0.000 0.52 0.62  Constant 0.48 0.02 0.000 0.44 0.51 
R2 0.10      R2 0.05     
             
 Epistemic efficacy   Early stoppage behavioral intent 
 b SE p 95% CI    b SE p 95% CI  
Stop message -0.03 0.04 0.519 -0.10 0.05  Stop message -0.01 0.05 0.918 -0.10 0.09 
Contingency caveat -0.01 0.01 0.444 -0.03 0.01  Contingency caveat -0.02 0.01 0.133 -0.05 0.01 
Concern 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.01 0.03  Concern -0.06 0.01 0.000 -0.07 -0.04 
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Stop message X concern 0.01 0.01 0.314 -0.01 0.02  Stop message X concern 0.03 0.01 0.000 0.02 0.05 
Constant 0.43 0.03 0.000 0.37 0.48  Constant 0.50 0.04 0.000 0.43 0.57 
R2 0.03      R2 0.14     
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Appendix 3. Robustness checks 
 
Table A10. Acceptance of uncertainty individual scale item models. 
 
 Item 1  Item 2  Item 3  Item 4 
 b SE p 95% CI  b SE p 95% CI  b SE p 95% CI  b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message -0.04 0.09 0.630 -.22 .13 - 0.10 0.09 0.261 -0.28 0.08  -0.14 0.10 0.137 -0.34 0.05  -0.19 0.08 0.011 -.34 -.05 
Contingency caveat 0.16 0.09 0.073 -0.01 0.33  -0.11 0.09 0.224 -0.29 0.07  -0.10 0.10 0.325 -0.29 0.10  0.00 0.08 0.964 -0.15 0.15 
Prior belief -0.09 0.02 0.000 -0.14 -0.05  0.04 0.02 0.067 0.00 0.09  0.07 0.03 0.006 0.02 0.12  -0.05 0.02 0.015 -0.09 -0.01 
Constant 4.82 0.12 0.000 4.58 5.06  3.47 0.13 0.000 3.23 3.73  4.39 0.13 0.000 4.13 4.65  5.34 0.10 0.000 5.14 5.55 
R2 0.02      0.01      0.01      0.01     
 
        
N = 1,042. Unstandardized, unscaled coefficients. Item 1: “I am comfortable accepting uncertainty in the guidelines issued by 
medical institutions”; Item 2: “New guidelines that contradict old guidelines make me uncomfortable” (reverse coded); Item 3: 
“There is no reason to follow new guidelines because they are always changing anyway” (reverse coded); Item 4: “I prefer to 




Table A11. Effects of Early Stoppage Message versus Full Course Message by Caveat, 
Alternative Treatment Dummies Model 
            
  Factual belief   General future compliance 
  b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message, no caveat -1.77 0.17 0.000 -2.11 -1.43 Stop message, no caveat 0.32 0.12 0.009 0.08 0.57 
Stop message, caveat -1.95 0.17 0.000 -2.29 -1.61 Stop message, caveat 0.38 0.12 0.002 0.14 0.63 
Full course message, caveat 0.08 0.17 0.636 -0.26 0.42 Full course message, caveat 0.05 0.12 0.709 -0.20 0.29 
Prior belief 0.39 0.03 0.000 0.32 0.45 Prior belief -0.01 0.02 0.754 -0.05 0.04 
Constant -0.13 0.18 0.461 -0.48 0.22 Constant 5.37 0.13 0.000 5.12 5.62 
R2 0.27         R2 0.01         
  Expert credibility   Acceptance of uncertainty 
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  b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message, no caveat 0.04 0.10 0.700 -0.15 0.23 Stop message, no caveat 0.13 0.07 0.088 -0.02 0.27 
Stop message, caveat 0.05 0.10 0.599 -0.14 0.24 Stop message, caveat 0.11 0.07 0.141 -0.04 0.26 
Full course message, caveat -0.07 0.10 0.493 -0.26 0.12 Full course message, caveat -0.01 0.07 0.941 -0.15 0.14 
Prior belief -0.02 0.02 0.234 -0.06 0.01 Prior belief -0.01 0.01 0.630 -0.03 0.02 
Constant 5.56 0.10 0.000 5.37 5.76 Constant 4.38 0.08 0.000 4.23 4.53 
R2 0.00         R2 0.01         
  Epistemic efficacy   Early stoppage behavioral intent 
  b SE p 95% CI   b SE p 95% CI 
Stop message, no caveat 0.05 0.11 0.647 -0.17 0.27 Stop message, no caveat -1.21 0.14 0.000 -1.49 -0.94 
Stop message, caveat 0.07 0.11 0.534 -0.15 0.29 Stop message, caveat -1.19 0.14 0.000 -1.47 -0.92 
Full course message, caveat -0.06 0.11 0.592 -0.28 0.16 Full course message, caveat -0.18 0.14 0.191 -0.46 0.09 
Prior belief -0.07 0.02 0.001 -0.11 -0.03 Prior belief 0.04 0.03 0.133 -0.01 0.09 
Constant 4.60 0.11 0.000 4.38 4.83 Constant 3.14 0.14 0.000 2.86 3.42 
R2 0.01         R2 0.11         
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Appendix 4: Stimuli text.  
 
Condition 1: stop -- Message 1.  
  
Antibiotics are used to treat or prevent some types of bacterial infection. But they don’t work for 
everything. Antibiotics don't work for viral infections such as colds and flu, and most coughs and 
sore throats. 
  
You may have heard about antibiotics in the news recently. There has been some disagreement 
about when or if patients should stop treatment. 
  
Medical experts want to let you know the consensus view on this matter. Experts recommend 
that for common bacterial infections:  
  
Patients should stop taking antibiotics when they feel better.  
  
Recent studies show that stopping antibiotic treatment early does not encourage antibiotic 
resistance as once thought, while taking antibiotics for longer than necessary increases the risk of 
resistance. 
  




Condition: stop + caveat -- Message 2.  
  
Antibiotics are used to treat or prevent some types of bacterial infection. But they don’t work for 
everything. Antibiotics don't work for viral infections such as colds and flu, and most coughs and 
sore throats. 
  
You may have heard about antibiotics in the news recently. There has been some disagreement 
about when or if patients should stop treatment. 
  
Medical experts want to let you know the consensus view on this matter. Experts recommend 
that for common bacterial infections:  
  
Patients should stop taking antibiotics when they feel better.  
  
Recent studies show that stopping antibiotic treatment early does not encourage antibiotic 
resistance as once thought, while taking antibiotics for longer than necessary increases the risk of 
resistance. 
  
However, the advice of medical professionals is contingent on the best current evidence and 
may evolve over time. 
  
As always, you should consult with your healthcare provider about your specific health needs. 




Condition: full course -- Message 3. 
  
Antibiotics are used to treat or prevent some types of bacterial infection. But they don’t work for 
everything. Antibiotics don't work for viral infections such as colds and flu, and most coughs and 
sore throats. 
  
You may have heard about antibiotics in the news recently. There has been some disagreement 
about when or if patients should stop treatment. 
  
Medical experts want to let you know the consensus view on this matter. Experts recommend: 
  
Patients should take the full course of antibiotics, even if they feel better. 
  
Stopping antibiotic treatment early may encourage antibiotic resistance. 
  
As always, you should consult with your healthcare provider about your specific health needs. 
  
  
Condition: full course + caveat  -- Message 4. 
  
Antibiotics are used to treat or prevent some types of bacterial infection. But they don’t work for 
everything. Antibiotics don't work for viral infections such as colds and flu, and most coughs and 
sore throats. 
  
You may have heard about antibiotics in the news recently. There has been some disagreement 
about when or if patients should stop treatment. 
  
Medical experts want to let you know the consensus view on this matter. Experts recommend: 
  
Patients should take the full course of antibiotics, even if they feel better. 
  
Stopping antibiotic treatment early may encourage antibiotic resistance. 
  
However, the advice of medical professionals is contingent on the best current evidence and 
may evolve over time. 
  
As always, you should consult with your healthcare provider about your specific health needs.
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Appendix 4. CONSORT-SPI 2018 checklist 
 
Section Item # CONSORT 2010 CONSORT-SPI 2018 Checklist (page numbers) 
Title and abstract  
  1a Identification as a randomised trial in the title§   1 
  1b Structured summary of trial design, methods, 
results, and conclusions (for specific guidance see 
CONSORT for Abstracts)§ 
Refer to CONSORT extension for 
social and psychological 





2a Scientific background and explanation of rationale§   3-8 
2b Specific objectives or hypotheses§ If pre-specified, how the 




 Trial design 3a Description of trial design (such as parallel, 
factorial), including allocation ratio§ 
If the unit of random assignment 
is not the individual, please refer 
to CONSORT for Cluster 
Randomised Trials [33] 
8-9 
3b Important changes to methods after trial 
commencement (such as eligibility criteria), with 
reasons 
  N/A 
 Participants 4a Eligibility criteria for participants§ When applicable, eligibility 
criteria for settings and those 
delivering the interventions 
8 
4b Settings and locations where the data were 
collected 
  8 
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 Interventions 5 The interventions for each group with sufficient 
details to allow replication, including how and 
when they were actually administered§ 
  8-10 
5a   Extent to which interventions 
were actually delivered by 
providers and taken up by 
participants as planned 
N/A 
5b   Where other informational 
materials about delivering the 
intervention can be accessed 
N/A 
5c   When applicable, how 
intervention providers were 
assigned to each group 
N/A 
 Outcomes 6a Completely defined pre-specified outcomes, 
including how and when they were assessed§ 
  10-12 
6b Any changes to trial outcomes after the trial 
commenced, with reasons 
  N/A 
 Sample size 7a How sample size was determined§   8 
7b When applicable, explanation of any interim 
analyses and stopping guidelines 
  N/A 
 Randomisation  
  Sequence 
generation 
8a Method used to generate the random allocation 
sequence 
  N/A 
8b Type of randomisation; details of any restriction 
(such as blocking and block size)§ 
  8 
  Allocation 
concealment 
mechanism 
9 Mechanism used to implement the random 
allocation sequence, describing any steps taken to 
conceal the sequence until interventions were 
assigned§ 
  N/A 
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Implementation 
10 Who generated the random allocation sequence, 
who enrolled participants, and who assigned 
participants to interventions§ 
  8 
  Awareness 
of assignment 
11a Who was aware of intervention assignment after 
allocation (for example, participants, providers, 
those assessing outcomes), and how any masking 
was done 
  N/A 
11b If relevant, description of the similarity of 
interventions 
  N/A 
  Analytical 
methods 
12a Statistical methods used to compare group 
outcomes§ 
How missing data were handled, 
with details of any imputation 
method 
15 
12b Methods for additional analyses, such as subgroup 
analyses, adjusted analyses, and process 
evaluations 
  13-15 
Results  
 Participant flow 
(a diagram is 
strongly 
recommended) 
13a For each group, the numbers randomly assigned, 
receiving the intended intervention, and analysed 
for the outcomes§ 
Where possible, the number 
approached, screened, and eligible 
prior to random assignment, with 
reasons for non-enrolment 
8-9 
13b For each group, losses and exclusions after 
randomisation, together with reasons§ 
  8-9 
 Recruitment 14a Dates defining the periods of recruitment and 
follow-up 
  8 
14b Why the trial ended or was stopped   N/A 
 Baseline data 15 A table showing baseline characteristics for each 
group§ 





16 For each group, number included in each analysis 
and whether the analysis was by original assigned 
groups§ 
  13-15 
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 Outcomes and 
estimation 
17a For each outcome, results for each group, and the 
estimated effect size and its precision (such as 95% 
confidence interval)§ 
Indicate availability of trial data 13-15 
17b For binary outcomes, the presentation of both 
absolute and relative effect sizes is recommended 
  N/A 
 Ancillary 
analyses 
18 Results of any other analyses performed, including 
subgroup analyses, adjusted analyses, and process 
evaluations, distinguishing pre-specified from 
exploratory 
  N/A 
 Harms 19 All important harms or unintended effects in each 
group (for specific guidance see CONSORT for 
Harms) 
  N/A 
Discussion  
 Limitations 20 Trial limitations, addressing sources of potential 
bias, imprecision, and, if relevant, multiplicity of 
analyses 
  17-18 
 Generalisability 21 Generalisability (external validity, applicability) of 
the trial findings§ 
  17 
 Interpretation 22 Interpretation consistent with results, balancing 
benefits and harms, and considering other relevant 
evidence 
  15-18 
Important information  
 Registration 23 Registration number and name of trial registry   8 
 Protocol 24 Where the full trial protocol can be accessed, if 
available 
  8 
 Declaration of 
interests 
25 Sources of funding and other support; role of 
funders 





26a   Any involvement of the 
intervention developer in the 
N/A 
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design, conduct, analysis, or 
reporting of the trial 
26b   Other stakeholder involvement in 
trial design, conduct, or analyses 
N/A 
26c   Incentives offered as part of the 
trial 
8 
 
